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STATE WILDLIFE REGULATION AND THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE: FALL OF THE STATE
OWNERSHIP DOCTRINE
Recent federal legislation' recognizes the importance of the na-
tion's wildlife2 and other natural resources.' As states respond with
additional regulations protective of such resources,4 environmental
and economic concerns will inevitably collide with greater fre-
quency.' Although the Supreme Court has rarely examined conser-
1. Examples of federal legislation on these subjects are: Endangered Species Act
of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.SC. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); National Environmen-
tal Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
2. Traditional views of wildlife are dissipating and Americans are now beginning
to recognize and appreciate the valuable contributions of wildlife to the environment.
Bertrand & Talbot, Preface in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA at iii (H. Brokaw ed. 1978).
For background on federal wildlife regulation, see M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (1977); Guilbert, Wildife Preservation under Federal Law,
in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 550 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974). For a
general discussion of federal conservation of fish and wildlife, see 3 F. GRAD, TREA-
TISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 12.04 (1978).
3. Exploitation of environmental resources often creates costs that exceed the
value of the resources themselves. I COUNCIL ON ENVT'L QUALITY ANN. REP. II
(1970).
4. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 541-560 (1977 & Supp. 1980) (pre-
vention and control of oil spillage); OR. REV. STAT. § 459.810-.890 (1979) (ban on
nonreturnable beverage bottles); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1521-1527 (Supp. 1980)
(ban on nonreturnable beverage bottles); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 88.16.170-.200
(Supp. 1980) (oil tanker regulations to protect against oil spills, partially invalidated
by Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978), for conflict with federal law
and the commerce clause).
5. States, recognizing the need to conserve the environment, have passed legisla-
tion which simultaneously protects the environment and interferes with resource ex-
ploitation commerce. See Note, The Negative Commerce Clause and State
Environmental Legislation--Externalities Suggest Application of the Tax Standard to
Environmental Regultions, 32 VAND. L. REV. 913, 914 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Neg-
ative Commerce Clause]. See generally B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE ch. 12
(1971), J. HITE, H. MACAULAY, J. STEPP, & B. YANDLE, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL QUALITY (1972); Asmussen & Bouchard, Wild and Scenic Rivers: Private
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vation statutes in light of the dormant federal commerce power,6 in
Hughes v. Oklahoma7 the Court prescribed the balancing approach
of commerce clause analysis' to evaluate confficts involving wildlife
regulations.
Hughes, a commercial minnow dealer, purchased natural min-
nows9 in Oklahoma from a licensed dealer. By attempting to trans-
port the minnows to Texas,'" he violated an Oklahoma statute"
prohibiting shipment of natural minnows out-of-state for commercial
purposes. Hughes appealed' 2 his conviction, alleging that the statute
was repugnant to the commerce clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. 3 The Supreme Court, accepting that argument, overturned the
conviction. 14
The drafters of the Constitution intended the commerce clause to
eliminate economic barriers between states by giving federal legisla-
tors power to regulate interstate commerce.15 This commerce power
,Rights andPublic Goods, in CONGRESS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 163 (R. Cooley & G.
Wandesforde-Smith eds. 1970).
6. The dormant commerce power refers to the unexercised power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce. See notes 16 & 18 and accompanying text infra. The
Court more frequently examines conservation statutes in terms of alleged conflict
with federal statutes or treaties or with some constitutional provision other than the
commerce clause, such as the privileges and immunities clause or the equal protection
clause. See note 28 and accompanying text infra.
7. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
8. See note 19 infra.
9. "Natural" minnows are minnows taken from natural waters, as opposed to
those raised in commercial hatcheries.
10. Hughes planned to transport the minnows from Purcell, Oklahoma, to his
commercial minnow business in Archer County, Texas.
11. The statute, part of the Oklahoma Wildlife Conservation Code of 1974, pro-
vides:
No person may transport or ship minnows for sale outside the state which were
seined or procured within the waters of this state except that:
1. Nothing contained herein shall prohibit any person from leaving the state
possessing three (3) dozen or less minnows;
2. Nothing contained herein shall prohibit sale and shipment of minnows
raised in a regularly licensed commercial minnow hatchery.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 4-115(B) (West 1976).
12. The highest Oklahoma criminal appellate court affirmed Hughes' conviction.
Hughes v. State, 572 P.2d 573 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cL 3. The commerce clause gives Congress the power
"ft]o regulate Commerce. . . among the several states." See notes 16-18 infra.
14. 441 U.S. at 325, 338 (1979).
15. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 533-34, 539 (1949).
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includes preemptive and dormant aspects.16 Congressional enact-
ment of legislation in a given area under the commerce clause may
preempt conflicting state law in that area.17 Unexercised commerce
Therein the Court discussed the state's lack of power to constrict the flow of interstate
commerce to protect its economic interests. The CQurt emphasized that centralizing
the regulation of interstate commerce was a primary purpose of the Constitutional
Convention, The framers of the Constitution believed centralization of power was
necessary to avoid the intense economic competition that existed among the states
under the Articles of Confederation. Id. at 533-34.
16. Eg., Note, State Environmental Protection Legislation and the Commerce
Clause, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1762, 1769 (1974). Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824), was the first major decision concerning a commerce clause challenge. In that
case, because federal preemption of the state statute made the inquiry unnecessary,
Chief Justice Marshall dismissed the question whether states retained power over
commerce until Congress exercised its right to regulate interstate commerce. Id. at
200. The Chief Justice, however, conceded "great force" to the argument that the
power to regulate interstate commerce was exclusively federal. Id. at 209.
The first Supreme Court decision to speak of a "dormant" commerce power was
Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829). There a Dela-
ware statute authorized construction of a dam Across a navigable stream. The dam
purportedly alleviated health problems caused by marshes along the creek. Since
Congress had passed no act affecting the case, Chief Justice Marshall found that the
statute could not "be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in
its dormant state." Id. at 252. The actual basis of the decision, however, appears to
be Marshall's acceptance of the statute as a valid exercise of the state police power
with no purpose to regulate commerce. See GAVIT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION 13-14 (1932).
One commentator summarized the development of commerce clause theories prior
to 1938: First, the clause implicitly prohibited all state regulation of interstate com-
merce, as suggested in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); second, the
clause did not prohibit state regulation in the absence of congressional action, as
stated by Chief Justice Taney in The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847);
third, the clause prohibited some, but not all, state regulation, as posited in Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); finally, the clause itself prohibited
nothing although restrictions on state regulation might arise should Congress deem
them necessary, as indicated in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890). Dowling, Inter-
state Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REv. 1, 2-6 (1940). For a discussion of
subsequent developments in the doctrine of congressional consent to state action, fo-
cusing on the ideas of Chief Justice Stone, see Dowling, Interstate Commerce and
State Power-Revised Version, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 547 (1947).
For additional perspectives on developments in judicial thought concerning the
commerce clause, see E. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES RIGHTS
(1936); F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND
WAITE (1937); J. KALLENBACH, FEDERAL COOPERATION WITH THE STATES UNDER
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE (1942); F. RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL POWER OVER
COMMERCE (1937).
17. "[In areas where activities of legitimate local concern overlap with the na-
tional interests expressed by the Commerce Clause-where local and national powers
are concurrent--the Court in the absence of congressional guidance is called upon to
1980]
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power, on the other hand, is merely "dormant;" despite its inaction,
Congress retains regulatory power over interstate commerce in an
area, and state governments generally may not interfere with the free
flow of that commerce.1
8
Dormant commerce clause analysis involves a judicial determina-
tion of whether a state statute improperly intrudes into an area re-
stricted to federal regulation.19 Despite extensive application of that
analysis to a broad range of interstate commerce questions, 20 the
Supreme Court retreated from the analysis late in the nineteenth cen-
tury in the context of state wildlife regulation by endorsing the state
ownership doctrine.21 This doctrine postulates that wildlife within a
make 'delicate adjustment of the conflicting state and federal claims."' A & P Tea
Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976).
18. See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429,440 (1978), where the
Supreme Court stated:
Long ago it was settled that even in the absence of a congressional exercise of
[the commerce] power, the Commerce Clause prevents the States from erecting
barriers to the free flow of interstate commerce. . . .At the same time, however,
it never has been doubted that much state legislation, designed to serve legitimate
state interests and applied without discrimination against interstate commerce,
does not violate the Commerce Clause even though it affects commerce.
19. Dormant commerce clause analysis has become more complex over the years.
In Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319-20 (1851), the Court held
that states shared the commerce power concurrently with Congress. Which of the two
could exert the power in a particular situation depended on whether the subject mat-
ter was of a local or national character. Id. The focus shifted in South Carolina State
Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 190 (1938), where the Court
found that state action was permissible if its goal was within the state's "province"
and if the legislation was "reasonably adapted" to the goal, although no definite stan-
dards were outlined for either condition. Several years later, in Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945), the Court identified a need to weigh federal and
state interests by balancing the burden on interstate commerce against the weight and
sufficiency of the state's interest in regulating the subject matter. Finally, in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970), the Court further refined its balancing
test. See notes 33-34 and accompanying text infra. For a thorough discussion of the
evolution of dormant commerce clause analysis, see Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 125.
20. See, e.g., Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964)
(regulation forcing local distributors to buy all available milk from local producers);
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (regulation requiring certain
type mudguard on trucks and trailers); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511
(1935) (statute setting minimum milk prices to be paid by dealers to producers); and
Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876) (license requirement for peddlers of out-of-
state goods).
21. Under the then prevailing view of the commerce clause, the Court may have
deemed wildlife regulation to be peculiarly "local" in character. See note 19 supra.
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state is the common property of the citizens of that state. As repre-
sentative of its people, the state retains the right to control and regu-
late the wildlife for its citizens' benefit.
In Geer v. Connecticut,22 the Supreme Court examined the state
ownership doctrine' before considering the extent to which a state
may regulate its wildlife without contravening the commerce
clause.2' In Geer, the defendant appealed his conviction for posses-
sion of game birds with the intent to ship them out of state. Though
Alternatively, the Court may have adopted the state ownership doctrine to avoid alto-
gether the task of analyzing the state's interest. Cf. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 805 (1976) (entrance into the market by the state itself is not "the
kind of action with which the Commerce Clause is concerned").
The state ownership doctrine is also referred to as the public ownership, public
trust, sovereign ownership, or quasi-sovereignty doctrine. Societies since ancient
times have recognized governmental power over things such as wildlife or air, on the
basis that they belong to no individual. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 522-29
(1896). Under this theory, the sovereign does not actually "own" such things, but
rather holds them in trust for the people's common benefit. Id. at 529. The Supreme
Court used the state ownership theory to uphold state regulations in Manchester v.
Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891) (controlling menhaden fisheries for the benefit of
the people of the state); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877) (limiting oyster
"planting" to state citizens, who have a property right in the tidewater beds of the
state); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855) (regulating manner of taking
oysters since soil below water is held by state in trust for people).
Even recently in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 392 (1978), Chief
Justice Burger's concurring opinion noted the state ownership doctrine "manifests the
State's special interest in regulating and preserving wildlife for the benefit of its citi-
zens." Burger believed the doctrine applied at least to animals that remained within
the borders of the state. Id. at 393.
For pre-Hughes discussions of the public trust doctrine and its applications in envi-
ronmental issues, see 1 V. YANNACONE, JR. & B. COHEN, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
& REMEDIES ch. 2, 15 (1971); Berlin, Kessler & Roisman, Law in Action: The Trust
Doctrine, in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 166 (M. Baldwin & J. Page eds. 1970); Sax,
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68
MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970); Note, The Public Trust Doctrine: A New Approach to Envi-
ronmental Preservation, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 455 (1979). All of these commentators
urge use of the public trust doctrine as a litigation tool to protect the environment and
to conserve wildlife and resources. Although Hughes may negate its utility in state
litigation, the doctrine should remain viable where the national trust function is at
issue.
22. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
23. Id. at 522-30. The Court traced the development of the doctrine from Athe-
nian and Roman law through French civil law and English common law to American
colonial and state law.
24. In Geer, the challenged Connecticut statute set out the open hunting season
for woodcock, quail, and ruffled grouse, but prohibited at all times their transporta-
tion out of state. Id. at 519.
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he had killed the birds lawfully, the defendant's intent to remove
them from Connecticut violated state law. Geer asserted that the
statute interfered with Congressional power to regulate interstate
commerce. The Court, however, acknowledged the state's right to
exclude game birds from the sphere of interstate commerce while
permitting them to lawfully remain in intrastate commerce. 25 As an
incident of state ownership, the state could place conditions upon the
taking of game which would remain with the game after they were
killed. Hence, Connecticut could validly keep its game birds within
its borders, even when a hunter had the birds lawfully within his pos-
session.
Many cases26 cite Geer for its support of the state ownership or
25. Id. at 530-32. The Court raised, without deciding, the question whether
"commerce" was in fact at issue:
[Ilt may well be doubted whether commerce is created by an authority given by a
state to reduce game within its borders to possession, provided such game be not
taken, when killed, without the jurisdiction of the state .... The qualification
which forbids its removal from the state necessarily entered into and formed part
of every transaction on the subject, and deprived the mere sale or exchange of
these articles of that element of freedom of contract and of full ownership which
is an essential attribute of commerce.
Id. at 530. The Court further noted that the game birds were a valuable food supply
to be preserved through the state police power for the people who owned them. The
state as sovereign had this duty even though interstate commerce might be indirectly
affected. .d. at 534-35.
In the view of Justice Field, dissenting, wild game beyond human control is not the
property of the state or of any person. Id. at 539. Field agreed that the state may
legislate to protect wild game, but it may not regulate interstate commerce. Id. at 541.
Field maintained that an animal lawfully killed or reduced to possession "becomes an
article of commerce, and its use cannot be limited to the citizens of one state to the
exclusion of citizens of another state." .d. at 538. "[This] view of the Geer dissenters
increasingly prevailed in subsequent cases." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329
(1979).
26. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 386 (1978) (state
has control over its wildlife, although it is not absolute; the doctrine on which Geer
relied still has vitality); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420-21
(1948) (invalidated discriminatory state fishing law on equal protection grounds, dist-
inguishing Geer as involving only the commerce clause); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385, 400 (1948) (invalidated state commercial shrimp fishing statutes, distinguishing
Geer as correctly decided independent of state ownership theory); Foster-Fountain
Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 11 (1928) (distinguishing legitimate legislative
purpose in Geer from improper economic motive, but recognizing state's sovereign
capacity over wildlife); Lacoste v. Department of Conserv., 263 U.S. 545, 549-50
(1924) (tax on animal skins and hides valid as payment for state's ownership interest);
Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 118, 120 (191-9) (state regulation prohibiting ship-
ment of wild ducks upheld as within state's power under Geer; no conflict with fed-
eral act relating to fixing of closed season); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138,
[Vol. 20:215
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"quasi-sovereignty" doctrine.27 After Geer, the Supreme Court relied
on the doctrine to uphold state regulations of wildlife under various
circumstances.28 Until Hughes, however, the Court had not reconsid-
ered the theory in a case factually analogous to Geer.29
Soon after Geer the Court began to reject the state ownership doc-
trine as justification for interference with interstate commerce in nat-
ural resources other than wildlife.3" Returning instead to a
145-46 (1914) (since state may preserve its wild game for its own citizens, statute
prohibiting resident aliens from killing game upheld against equal protection chal-
lenge); Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1908) (statute
prohibiting diversion of water out of state valid as within state's right to maintain its
natural advantages unimpaired); Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190,208-09 (1900)
(distinguishing oil and natural gas deposits from animalsferae naturae but upholding
regulation against waste of real property, a subject within state's authority); Ward v.
Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 507 (1896) (in view of state's "unquestioned" power to
regulate taking of game, state hunting regulations held constitutional as applied to
Indians on reservation despite hunting rights under treaty).
In New York v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31, 41 (1908), the Court relied not on Geer's
state ownership doctrine but on its state police power rationale to find that a statute
prohibiting possession of specified game birds during the closed season was not a
regulation of interstate commerce. And in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230, 237-38 (1907), the Court, although not citing Geer, relied on the quasi-
sovereignty doctrine to justify an injunction against noxious fumes coming from an-
other state. For a discussion of this case and use of the quasi-sovereignty doctrine in
state actions, see Garton, The State Versus Extraterritorial Pollution--States' "Envi-
ronmental Rights" Under Federal Common Law, 2 ECOLOGY L. Q. 313 (1972).
27. See note 21 supra.
28. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) (higher non-
resident license fees for hunting elk upheld when challenged under privileges and
immunities and equal protection clauses rather than under commerce clause; Court
noted, however, that elk hunting was not a commercial activity); Lacoste v. Depart-
ment of Conserv., 263 U.S. 545 (1924) (tax not equivalent to prohibition, thus sever-
ance tax on skins and hides taken from wild animals or alligators upheld under
commerce clause attack); Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 118 (1919) (prohibition
against shipment of wild ducks upheld under claim of preemption by Federal Migra-
tory Bird Act); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914) (prohibition against
hunting by resident aliens upheld when challenged under due process and equal pro-
tection clauses); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896) (hunting regulations upheld
against claim of preemption by federal treaty).
29. "The case before us is the first in modem times to present facts essentially on
all fours with Geer." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335 (1979).
30. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) and West v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (statutes restricting the flow of natural
gas beyond the borders of the state producing it held invalid). To circumvent the
state ownership doctrine, the West Court distinguished the property status of wildlife
from that of a natural resource such as gas. 221 U.S. at 253. The state may prohibit
as well as regulate the taking of wildlife without depriving anyone of private property,
1980]
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commerce clause analysis, the Court eventually adopted a balancing
approach3' which evolved 32 into the formulation outlined in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.3' This analysis requires the reviewing court first
to consider the interests underlying the challenged regulation and the
regulation's effect on interstate commerce. The court must then
weigh the benefits accruing to the state against the burdens on inter-
state commerce. 34 The Court adopted the Pike analysis for burden-
since wildlife belongs to no one until taken. Natural gas, however, belongs to the
surface proprietor, and a prohibition on its removal results in a taking of private
property. Id. Gas which a surface proprietor chooses to sell may be a subject of
interstate as well as intrastate commerce. Id. at 255. The state may, within its police
power, regulate the taking of the gas, but may not prohibit its transportation in inter-
state commerce. Id. at 262.
The Pennsylvania case used the West Court's reasoning to invalidate a West Vir-
ginia statute confining the state's natural gas to use within its borders. The Court
declared the statute unconstitutional despite the state's argument that it was a conser-
vation measure to protect a shrinking supply of the resource for the people of the
state. 262 U.S. at 598-600.
The results in these cases imply a finding by the Court that the federal interest in
unrestricted interstate commerce in gas outweighed both the state's property interest
in its natural gas and its interest in reserving the resource for its own citizens.
31. See, e.g., Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179
(1950), wherein the Court upheld an Oklahoma regulation setting minimum prices to
be paid for gas produced in that state. "The only requirements consistently recog-
nized have been that the regulation not discriminate against or place an embargo on
interstate commerce, that it safeguard an obvious state interest, and that the local
interest at stake outweigh whatever national interest there might be in the prevention
of state restrictions." Id. at 186-87.
32. See note 19 supra.
33. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Plaintiff-appellee grew cantaloupes in Arizona, but
maintained its packing facilities in a nearby California town. Under authority of an
Arizona statute requiring all Arizona-grown fruits and vegetables to be packed in
approved standard containers, an Arizona official ordered the company to stop trans-
porting uncrated cantaloupes to its California packing plant. The statute was
designed to prevent deceptive packaging and a resultant lowered reputation for Ari-
zona growers, id. at 143; the official's application of the statute, however, had a much
broader impact since the order would force the company to relocate its packing facili-
ties within Arizona. Id. at 144-45. Although the Court found the state had a legiti-
mate interest in enhancing grower reputation, it was inadequate to justify such a
burden on interstate commerce. .d. at 143, 145.
34. Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will
be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. . . . If a legitimate local purpose is found,
then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will
be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved,
and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities.
[Vol. 20:215
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some regulations,35 with an additional requirement later enunciated
in Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission:36 When the
challenging party demonstrates that the statute discriminates against,
rather than merely burdens, interstate commerce, the state must show
both that the statute is justified because of the local benefits it pro-
vides and that no adequate nondiscriminatory alternatives exist.37
The Court refrained from using the balancing approach in a recent
natural resource case, City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,38 which in-
validated a New Jersey statute prohibiting importation of solid waste
for disposal in New Jersey landfils.39 Regardless of legislative intent
to protect the environment or to conserve land resources, 40 the Court
held that the statute violated the commerce clause.4' In the Court's
view, the statute overtly discriminated against interstate commerce
for economic protectionist reasons.42 Having made that determina-
tion, the Court found a balancing of benefits and burdens unneces-
Id. at 142.
35. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (regula-
tions prohibiting double-trailer units and limiting truck length invalidated under Pike
as unduly burdening interstate commerce); A & P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366
(1976) (regulation requiring that another state selling milk in Mississippi sign reci-
procity agreement to accept Mississippi milk invalidated under Pike as impermissibly
burdening interstate commerce).
36. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
37. Id. at 353.
38. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
39. Operators of private landfills in New Jersey and their out-of-state customers
challenged the statute. Id. at 619.
40. As stated in the statute, its purpose was protection of the environment and of
public health and safety. Supreme Court noted that the New Jersey Supreme Court
had added the purpose of conservation. Id. at 625.
41. Id. at 628-29.
42. "On its face, [the statute] imposes on out-of-state commercial interests the full
burden of conserving the State's remaining landfill space." Id. at 628. According to
the Court, the statute was discriminatory because it banned out-of-state waste but
permitted disposal of domestic waste in New Jersey landfills. Id. at 629. For com-
ments on the Court's analysis, see Sisk, State Environmental Protection Versus the
Commerce Power, 13 U. RicH. L. REv. 197, 201 n.29 (1979); Negative Commerce
Clause, supra note 5, at 922-26.
For a discussion of state laws having different impacts on in-state and out-of-state
commercial interests, see Maltz, The Burger Court, the Commerce Clause, and the
Problem of Diferential Treatment, 54 IND. L. J. 165 (1979). For the theory that inter-
state commerce sometimes discriminates against the state, thereby justifying protec-
tionist legislation, see Negative Commerce Clause, supra note 5.
1980]
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sary.43
Although the New Jersey Court was unwilling to consider the
state's interest once it labeled the statute overtly discriminatory, a
year later it retreated from this position in Hughes v. Oklahoma. In
Hughes,' the Court expressly overruled Geer,45 declaring a modified
version of the Pike analysis as the guideline for testing state wildlife
regulations challenged under the commerce clause.46 The new analy-
sis, which weaves the element of discrimination into the traditional
Pike test,47 requires three determinations. First, the court must de-
cide whether the regulation applies evenhandedly or discriminates,
facially4" or practically, against interstate commerce. Second, the
court has to determine whether the regulation effectuates a legitimate
state purpose. Finally, if the regulation does effectuate a legitimate
state end, the court must consider whether other nondiscriminatory
43. The Court set up a rigid dichotomy to examine the statute. The statute was
either "protectionist" in nature, or it was "directed to legitimate local concerns," af-
fecting interstate commerce only incidentally. 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
[Where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually
per se rule of invalidity has been erected. . . . The clearest example of such
legislation is a law that overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a State's
borders. . . . But where other legislative objectives are credibly advanced and
there is no patent discrimination against interstate trade, the Court has adopted a
much more flexible approach, the general contours of which were outlined in
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc ...
Id.
The Court seemed to overlook its Hunt formulation for determining the validity of
discriminatory legislation. See note 37 and accompanying text supra. Under the
Hunt approach, the Court would have applied a balancing test after requiring the
state to justify the challenged statute. Upon finding this statute facially discrimina-
tory, however, the Court summarily invalidated it without "shifting the burden" to
the state.
44. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
45. Id. at 325. See notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra.
46. 441 U.S. at 335. The Court concluded that commerce clause challenges to
wildlife regulations "should be considered according to the same general rule applied
to state regulations of other natural resources. . . . We thus bring our analytical
framework into conformity with practical realities." Id.
47. Two determinations by the Court-that the Oklahoma statute was discrimina-
tory and that the Pike test was the appropriate analytical tool-mandated the modifi-
cation since the test outlined in Hunt, not Pike, was the Court's pre-New Jersey
standard for evaluating discriminatory legislation. See notes 34-43 and accompany-
ing text supra.
48. A finding of facial discrimination is determinative of invalidity under the New
Jersey approach. See note 43 supra.
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means are available to achieve the same purpose.49
The Hughes Court, finding the Oklahoma statute discriminatory
on its face,50 did not summarily end the inquiry as in New Jersey, but
instead invoked "strict scrutiny" for parts two and three of the modi-
fied Pike test."' While conceding that the state's purpose might be
legitimate,52 the Court questioned the effectiveness of the regulation
49. 441 U.S. at 336.
50. Id. "[The statute] forbids the transportation of natural minnows out of the
State for purposes of sale, and thus 'overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at
[the] State's borders."' Id. at 336-37 (second bracket in original).
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, argued that the statute was not discriminatory but
was rather, at most, minimally burdensome. Id. at 344. Since it prohibited residents
as well as nonresidents from exporting natural minnows for sale purposes, the statute
applied "even-handedly." Id. Justice Rehnquist further argued that the statute did
not block interstate commerce in minnows since anyone could "freely export as many
minnows as he wishes, so long as the minnows so transported are hatchery minnows
and not naturally seined minnows." Id. at 345. In order to transport hatchery min-
nows, however, presumably one would first have to buy them from a hatchery. This
argument therefore tends to support Hughes' characterization of the statute as serving
in-state commercial interests. See Brief for Appellant at 11-12, Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322 (1979).
The Court has described as "clearly impermissible" any statute which attempts "to
saddle those outside the State with the entire burden" of meeting the statute's goal.
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978). The disagreement over
the Oklahoma statute's status emphasizes, however, the difficulty in distinguishing
between a statute that is "discriminatory" and one that merely "burdens" interstate
commerce.
51. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
"Strict scrutiny," usually invoked for equal protection challenges, signals a more
rigorous review of a statute. In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144
(1938), Justice Stone suggested reasons for a two-tiered standard of review. He noted
that courts typically accord a presumption of constitutionality to a state regulation.
Id. at 152. Some regulations, however, do not warrant such a presumption and thus
call for stricter scrutiny by the court. An example is a regulation restricting the "polit-
ical processes" that would ordinarily cause the "repeal of undesirable legislation."
Id. at 152 n.4. For explanation of the "political processes" rationale, see Sisk, State
Environmental Protection Versus the Commerce Power, 13 U. RiCH. L. REv. 197, 200-
01(1979).
Apparently the Hughes Court did not invoke "strict scrutiny" in the traditional
sense. The phrase here is more likely a recharacterization of the requirement in Hunt
that the burden of justification shifts to the state when the opposing party shows that
the statute is discriminatory. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
52. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979). Oklahoma contended "the
purpose, operation and practical effect of [the statute was] readily apparent as a con-
servation measure." Brief for Appellee at 8, Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322
(1979). The State argued that the statute protected the ecological balance by preserv-
ing the minnow population. Id. at 4. Counsel for Hughes argued that the statute's
actual purpose was "to create a policy of economic protectionism by the use of an
1980]
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and found the state failed to choose the least discriminatory means
available to achieve its purpose.53 Therefore, the statute violated the
commerce clause.
54
Hughes v. Oklahoma signals the end of the state ownership doc-
trine55 for wildlife regulation. In the commerce context, the doctrine
was an anomaly, producing results inconsistent with the bulk of in-
terstate commerce decisions.56 Because of those inconsistencies, the
Court began curbing the doctrine's use almost as soon as it was
adopted.57 The doctrine became more judicially intolerable as state
governments abused it by cloaking constitutionally impermissible
motives or ineffectual laws with its rationale.58 The state ownership
doctrine served to justify too many wildlife regulations that restricted
export discrimination," and its effect was to bolster the state's commercial hatchery
minnow business. Brief for Appellant at 11-12, Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322
(1979).
The Court recognized as important the local interest in preserving the ecosystem of
intrastate bodies of water. 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979). The Court continued:
We consider the States' interests in conservation and protection of wild animals
as legitimate local purposes similar to the States' interests in protecting the health
and safety of their citizens .... But the scope of legitimate state interests in
"conservation" is narrower under this analysis than it was under Geer.... The
fiction of state ownership may no longer be used to force those outside the State
to bear the full costs of "conserving" the wild animals within its borders when
equally effective nondiscriminatory conservation measures are available.
Id.
53. Id. at 337-38.
54. Id. at 338.
55. For discussion of state ownership, see note 21 supra.
56. Compare Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891) and McCready v.
Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877) (approving confinement of wildlife benefits to state citi-
zens) with Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) and West v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (declaring states may not reserve their resources
for their own citizens).
57. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329 (1979). See, e.g., Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229
(1911).
58. Under the state ownership doctrine, a state avoided any need to justify its
wildlife regulations or to enact regulations that neatly fitted asserted or implied state
goals. See, e.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977), where the
state argued that its statute prohibiting nonresidents from catching menhaden (a com-
mercially valuable fish) was a legitimate conservation measure. The Court found that
claim "specious." "Virginia makes no attempt to restrict the quantity of menhaden
caught by her own residents. A statute that leaves a state's residents free to destroy a
natural resource while excluding aliens or nonresidents is not a conservation law at
alL" Id. at 285 n.21. The Court held that the Federal Enrollment and Licensing Act
preempted the Virginia statute. The Court noted, however, that "reasonable and
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freedom of action without accomplishing purported environmental
goals.
59
When the opportunity arose in Hughes for the Court to examine a
dormant commerce clause challenge to one of those ineffective regu-
lations," the result was not surprising. The decision to rescind the
special status previously accorded wildlife regulations allowed the
Court to apply the usual dormant commerce clause analysis rather
than uphold the statute solely on the basis of state ownership. The
surprising element of Hughes is that the Court, despite its finding of
overt discrimination, failed to follow its recent New Jersey decision.61
The Court chose instead to return to the more deferential balancing
approach,62 allowing at the minimum a formal consideration of the
state's interests.
In Hughes, the Court noted that no evidence appeared to support a
conclusion that the challenged statute achieved its proffered goals of
protecting the minnow population and preserving the ecological bal-
ance.63 Since this wildlife statute did not in fact promote the state's
interest in wildlife conservation, there was no benefit to the state to
offset any burden on interstate commerce. Under this balancing ap-
proach, the Court was forced to rule that the statute violated the com-
merce clause. The Court alluded, however, that a modified version
of the statute--one based on effective nondiscriminatory alterna-
evenhanded conservation measures, so essential to the preservation of our vital
marine sources of food supply, stand unaffected by our decision." Id. at 288.
59. See note 58 supra But cf. State v. Kemp, 73 S.D. 458, 44 N.W.2d 214 (1950),
appeal drmisrsed, 340 U.S. 923 (1951) (total exclusion of nonresident hunters of mi-
gratory waterfowl upheld against privileges and immunities claim because state
showed real danger existed that breeding grounds would be excessively hunted and
possibly destroyed by nonresident hunters).
60. The Oklahoma statute was ineffective to maintain the ecobalance because it
allowed removal of unlimited numbers of natural minnows. The statute even permit-
ted transporting the minnows out-of-state, so long as they were not sold out-of-state.
Sale of the minnows in-state rather than out-of-state causes no less disturbance to the
minnow population.
61. See notes 38-43 and accompanying text supra.
62. Under both the Pike analysis for burdensome regulations and the Hunt analy-
sis for discriminatory regulations, the Court can weigh the benefits to the state against
the interference with interstate commerce. See notes 34 & 37 and accompanying text
supra. The balancing approach thus allows the Court to be more cognizant of a
state's interests.
63. 441 U.S. 322, 338 n.20 (1979).
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tives-might have survived.'
The result in Hughes v. Oklahoma is not a setback for conservation
and environmentalism.65 The Court explicitly affirmed its position
that conservation and protection of wild animals are legitimate state
purposes.66 While previously a state could freely control wildlife
within its boundaries by merely claiming "state ownership," wildlife
regulations must now actually promote wildlife preservation in a
manner that least interferes with interstate commerce. By discarding
the state ownership theory, the Court demonstrated that a state can
no longer rely on recitation of an outmoded doctrine to ease its wild-
life regulations past commerce clause challenges. Replacement of the
doctrine with the balancing approach demands increased legislative
responsibility. To withstand judicial scrutiny under the new analysis,
a wildlife statute must be carefully drafted so that its goals are in fact
attainable through its enforcement.67 Hughes v. Oklahoma encour-
ages attainment of environmental protection, which is, after all, the
aim of environmental legislation.
Nancy 4. James
64. Id. at 338. Possible changes included universal application of limits on min-
now removal and use.
65. This stance assumes that judges will use the balancing approach in good faith
and not as an excuse to invalidate nondiscriminatory legislation capable of meeting
environmental goals that they may consider less important than economic interests.
66. 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
67. Legislators should draft environmental statutes so that any interference with
interstate commerce is merely burdensome rather than discriminatory in nature. If
the statute discriminates, it probably will be invalid unless there are no nondiscrimi-
natory alternatives.
If evidence shows that an environmental regulation is effective and that it merely
burdens interstate commerce, the regulation should enjoy a rebuttable presumption
that the same level of effectiveness could not be attained with less intrusion on inter-
state commerce. Such a regulation represents a legislative judgment that environmen-
tal protection is an important goal. The Court recognizes that goal as legitimate. If
the goal is being accomplished, a court should not substitute its judgment that the
interest in interstate commerce is weightier. To measure the competing worth of two
so dissimilar goals is a task both arduous and essentially unfair, given their disparate
susceptibility to valuation.
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